Something is moving on the islands

The election day of 7 May, read the next day with the ballots already open, left a political map of the United Kingdom that does not resemble the one we have been reading for decades. It should be noted without euphoria and without a definitive diagnosis: as an observational exercise.

In Wales, Plaid Cymru won 43 seats and became Senedd's main force for the first time. Reform UK came in second with 34. Labour, for decades the dominant force in Welsh politics, fell to 9. Rhun ap Iorwerth was elected First Minister with the support of Plaid members and the two Green representatives. Something that for years sounded peripheral happened at the centre of the Welsh political scene.

Scotland confirms the picture with another significant piece of data. The SNP won 58 seats and the Greens 15: together, 73 out of 129. It is not an absolute majority of the SNP, but a clear pro-independence majority in Holyrood. The detail matters: the SNP lost six seats compared to 2021, hit by attrition, internal scandals and electoral competition; but the shift towards the Greens maintained the bloc's strength. The cause did not grow linearly: it was rearranged.

In England, the map completes the picture. Labour suffered a severe loss of local seats, Reform UK advanced strongly and traditional parties again showed difficulty in ordering stable representation. What is breaking is not just a government: it is a form of political intermediation.

Northern Ireland does not belong exactly to this same election night, but it does belong to the same historical climate. Sinn Féin had already been the first force in the Northern Irish Assembly in 2022 and, in 2024, became the largest Northern Irish party in Westminster. The Irish question, which for years seemed to be managed by the inertia following the Belfast Agreement, is rephrased with another intensity. Not because a reunification referendum is immediate, but because the question ceased to seem purely abstract.

It is prudent to be cautious. In Scotland, participation fell. The SNP had already suffered previous setbacks in Westminster. In Wales, Plaid has no majority of its own. In England, Reform has yet to demonstrate whether it can transform protest vote into governing capacity. But even with those caveats, the set leaves a difficult picture to read with the usual categories.

Celtic nations reorganize politically at the same time that English bipartisanship loses centrality. And that happens, in addition, with a radical right-wing populist actor capitalizing on the vacuum of representation.

For those of us who think of liberal democracy as a fragile balance between representation, institutions, and memory, all of this demands attention. It is not enough to celebrate the new or regret the lost. We must look carefully at what is being built, what is being disassembled and what kind of political authority can be born when the center stops ordering.