We Have Been Warned

Over the past decade, and with greater intensity during the 2023–2026 cycle, multiple structural, economic, political and social indicators suggest that the international system is in a phase of accelerated deterioration of the mechanisms that have historically contained large-scale conflict. Far from being a spontaneous or circumstantial phenomenon, this dynamic follows recurring historical patterns that, in previous cycles, preceded systemic wars with the direct participation of the hegemonic power of the day. Today, the domestic and foreign conduct of the United States (the current, contested hegemon of the international system) shows a worrying convergence with those patterns.[1]

Since the start of Donald Trump's second term, U.S. foreign policy has moved from managing the liberal international order — founded and promoted for its own benefit — toward an explicit logic of strategic competition, denial and coercion. The doctrinal reconfiguration of the national security strategy published at the end of 2025, known as the "Trump Corollary" or the "Donroe Doctrine," marks a turning point: the United States redefines the "Western Hemisphere" as a space of exclusive vital interest, reviving a maximalist reading of the Monroe Doctrine, but adapted to competition with China and Russia (the latter with nuances), and even with a confrontational outlook toward its European allies. This shift is not merely rhetorical, as many came to believe during Trump's first term. With the MAGA project consolidated, it translates into direct pressure on pivotal countries, control of strategic chokepoints and a public willingness to use coercive instruments.[2]

The case of the Panama Canal is illustrative. President Donald Trump's statements about "taking back" control of the canal, together with Secretary of State Marco Rubio's explicit warnings about Chinese influence over Panamanian port infrastructure, revealed a logic of strategic denial typical of pre-conflict stages.[3] Historically, when a hegemonic power prioritizes direct or indirect control of critical logistical nodes, it tends to do so out of a perception that the systemic balance is eroding and that interdependence is no longer enough to guarantee security. The protection of the canal is connected to the theories of the American naval strategist Alfred Mahan; the pattern of liberal tolerance of recent decades is thus set aside in favor of a renewed realist stance on the management of geostrategic spaces.[4]

A similar dynamic can be seen in Venezuela. The military escalation in the Caribbean, which mobilized up to 30% of the U.S. Navy's capabilities, proved not to be a bluff after the controversial but efficient capture of Nicolás Maduro. Meanwhile, Trump's public statements — qualified by Rubio — about the seizure and sale of up to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil under U.S. control, along with intensified sanctions and interdiction operations, fit the historical pattern of securitizing strategic resources ahead of major conflicts.[5]

The transition under Delcy Rodríguez's regime has been strategic, though stingy with the hopes of an opposition that longed to see Chávez's heirs fall. The Venezuelan dictatorship changed its face and its patron, and now lends itself as a strategic partner in hydrocarbons and minerals, at a time when the United States needed a counterweight to achieve its goals in Iran. The Trump administration has made clear that its priority is not democracy but securing control of resources.

In earlier cycles — from oil in the first half of the twentieth century to grain in Antiquity — the coercive control of resources has been an early marker of systemic escalation. Cuba (which the United States believes will collapse under its own weight without Venezuelan support, and on which tougher sanctions have been imposed), Nicaragua (another of the Americas' dictatorships, which has chosen to retreat into autarky), Brazil and Mexico (despite relatively friendly exchanges between Trump and Sheinbaum, and even with Petro himself) are all under pressure, and the use of military force against them has not been ruled out.

What happened in Colombia's elections was also revealing. Despite positive figures supporting Gustavo Petro's administration on several macroeconomic and social indicators, the country opted for an antagonistic candidate who would guarantee closer ties with Trump's White House. Abelardo de la Espriella — the flamboyant former defense lawyer for paramilitaries, a U.S. citizen and an open supporter of Trump — wasted no time in revealing that his mission is a total realignment with the United States and, strikingly, with Israel. The response to the earthquake of August 10, 2026 made this plain: better to sacrifice one's own citizens than to maintain active ties with the spokespeople of the global left.

That seems to be the tone the reactionary right sets in all its headlines, but one that academia and other spheres of epistemic authority refuse to accept. The "culture war" has gone from being a discourse of YouTube and social media to becoming transnational public policy. Left behind, as little more than a vestige, is the space for tolerating ideological differences as the natural order of human thought — something that can be debated and embraced as a merit. The current moment calls for the destruction and harm of the enemy.

The clearest example is in the Middle East. Gaza has been devastated in full view of the world, to the point that the number of dead cannot even be counted with certainty, turning tens of thousands into something anecdotal, without any remorse.[6] Netanyahu has been shielded and serves as a regional operator to weaken the Islamic segments so alien and opposed to Washington. Favors are repaid even in institutional terms: the race to discredit the United Nations system, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, is being run in the digital sphere as well as on the political, diplomatic and economic stages.

This exposed the fact that the aura of sanctity some international officials and judges came to believe they possessed was nothing of the sort. Prudence, postures of technical neutrality and servility toward the funders of the multilateral system have been of little use. The apparatus is being strangled from within, and the message is clear: there is a new global order, and developmentalist and liberal agendas are a thing of the past.

Of course, the system will resist. In the first instance, the Iranian regime was practically brought to its knees in two weeks, losing much of its political-religious and military leadership, and has been exposed to internal pressure in a way that has crippled its international projection.[7] However, the damage inflicted on U.S. bases and allied facilities in the region, as well as the choking of the Strait of Hormuz, have given Iran (and its international ideological allies) reason to believe that not all is lost.

And that is true. Not every piece of the puzzle needs to fit a single narrative line for us to speak of a new global order. Iran can remain a counterweight that wounds and contains the Trump–Netanyahu axis. Yet it does not do so comfortably, and it faces its own internal race against time. The segments opposed to the Ayatollahs' regime exist; they can be contained in the streets by force, and in politics through espionage and the prison system, but their existence will continue to be nourished from abroad.

One need not look far on the map to understand that the international shift is tolerant of "lesser evils." In Syria, the rise of a man considered one of the world's worst terrorists just a couple of years ago was accepted, while Turkey and Israel carve up the former fiefdom of the fallen dictator Bashar al-Assad.[8] Authoritarians are being offered an escape hatch. Violations of human rights and international law can be ignored as long as they serve economic objectives.

On the domestic political front, the United States shows clear signs of internal securitization. Migration discourse has evolved from legal frameworks toward identity-based and civilizational narratives, with ethnic references and an explicitly racist tone, in statements by President Trump and key figures such as Stephen Miller. Department of Homeland Security data point to more than 622,000 removals and roughly 1.9 million "self-deportations" in 2025 — figures that reflect large-scale coercive mobilization.[9]

The Supreme Court even stayed an order restricting certain ICE detentions in Los Angeles and allowed, while litigation continues, factors such as location, type of work, language or apparent ethnicity to be considered together to establish reasonable suspicion.[10] Although apparent ethnicity alone cannot justify a detention, audiovisual evidence shows the gap between law and practice: ICE agents are on a permanent hunt for anyone who departs from the visual standard of what an American "should" look like. History shows that the ethnicization of political discourse and the construction of an "internal enemy" tend to precede more aggressive foreign policies, by lowering the domestic political costs of confrontation.

There are also pockets of resistance at home, with political figures who have openly challenged the situation, among them Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Bernie Sanders, Governors Gavin Newsom and Tim Walz, and New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani. Some activist groups have also organized collectively to respond to the escalation against migrants. Nevertheless, day to day there has been little resistance to a process that, on the contrary, enjoys broad support among Donald Trump's political base. The killing of Renee Nicole Good in Minneapolis seemed poised to be a breaking point, but for now neither the indiscriminate shipment of migrants to countries that are not even their own — leaving hundreds of people stranded under the tutelage of African dictatorships — nor the Salvadoran concentration camp, CECOT, has managed to forge a stance capable of reining in DHS or ICE.[11]

In parallel, there is a profound reconfiguration of the security and defense apparatus. For 2027, the United States has submitted a request for approximately $1.5 trillion in total defense budget resources, up from an overall defense ceiling of approximately $1 trillion approved for 2026, amid explicit pressure on industry to accelerate the production of munitions and platforms.[12] Trump has publicly demanded that defense contractors increase their investment and build new factories on U.S. soil.

This fiscal-industrial leap does not respond to any real need, since the United States already has the most powerful military capability in the world. Rather, it aligns with patterns observed before the two world wars, when the dominant power launched processes of partial economic mobilization under the narrative of "dangerous times." In political terms, everything fits the ideology prevailing at the top of power: the view that a few are destined to rule over everything, and that the weakest, or those who are different, must accept this as a natural reality.

The relationship between the United States and NATO reinforces this diagnosis. Although Washington has symbolically reaffirmed its commitment to the Alliance — with Mark Rutte playing the regrettable role of flatterer — it has also pushed for a historic increase in allied defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.[13] There have already been heated exchanges provoked by the turn Trump has given to the dynamics of support for Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky went from being applauded in the U.S. Congress to being publicly humiliated by an administration that is docile toward Putin's Russia and harsh toward the invaded state.

European partners have tried to join forces to press the United States to strengthen its support for Ukraine's territorial defense, but the White House's ambiguous stance continues to cause deep unease among members of the Atlantic Alliance.

This has been aggravated further by Trump's repeated statements about the "need" for the United States to control Greenland for national security reasons. With Stephen Miller, deputy chief of staff for policy and homeland security adviser, publicly arguing that the United States can allow itself to occupy any weaker state, and a State Department willing to push for the purchase of Greenland despite the rupture this would mean with Denmark (one of NATO's most loyal allies), strategic ambiguity is being introduced within the alliance itself. This is a phenomenon historically associated with a higher risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation — one that even shaped the switching of sides during the two world wars.[14]

But that is not all. From an academic standpoint, authors such as Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy and Jack Levy have shown that hegemonic wars tend to emerge when fiscal stress, perceived offensive advantages on the part of a power, and failures of bargaining capacity converge. The contemporary case presents a striking convergence: the geoeconomic fragmentation documented by the IMF and UNCTAD (a body the United States left as part of an enormous list of 66 organizations it abandoned); accelerated international rearmament according to the IISS; the domestic political polarization flagged by several bodies, including Freedom House and V-Dem; and the proliferation of explicit regional-denial doctrines in official statements.[15]

Donald Trump despises the system that his own country founded as the victor of the Second World War. Indeed, he has gone so far as to say that he does not need international law and that his decisions are based on his own morality. This is clear from the abandonment of dozens of multilateral institutions and the closure of USAID.[16] This has strangled the international bureaucracy and a broad sector of those who worked on democratization, economic development, the fight against climate change and gender parity. Although this may be welcomed by reactionary conservatism, the results may translate into a deterioration in the living conditions and survival of tens of thousands of beneficiaries around the world, which in turn opens the door to conflict and, above all, to the loss of an umbrella for preventing interstate tensions.

None of the above implies categorical determinism or immediacy; there are, of course, nuances and mistakes on the part of the left-wing counterparts, who had their moment to demonstrate a better model. However, the simultaneous accumulation of the factors mentioned — especially when they stem from the behavior of the hegemon that has served as guarantor of the system for decades — constitutes a robust historical signal pointing toward collapse.

In previous cycles, when the dominant power hardened its domestic policy, redefined its vital interests in exclusionary terms and extended the logic of security and nationalism to multiple domains (economic, migratory, territorial and technological), the result was a systemic environment highly prone to large-scale conflict. The deterioration of the liberal multilateral system recalls the failure of the League of Nations and the end of the so-called Concert of Europe.

In sum, the world is not heading toward global conflict because of an isolated event, nor out of any desire to alarm the readers of these paragraphs, but because of the convergence of recognizable historical patterns. U.S. policy, in both its domestic and foreign dimensions, today acts as a central accelerator of these dynamics. Some factors of restraint remain; some trust that a Democratic victory in the November 2026 midterms could create a counterweight to the unbridled process of global decoupling promoted by Trump's White House, backed by the Republican majority in the legislature.

Nevertheless, the United States has suffered a severe blow to its soft power. Many of its allies have lost confidence in American leadership, above all because they believe that, even if Trump leaves power, the balance of political forces could at any moment once again install a leader just as harmful to the liberal order. The occupants of the White House, the House and the Senate seem not to care, and have instead accelerated their radicalizing populist narrative. For now, the mission is to consolidate a more comfortable space for the white population, even if this may entail serious costs for the rest of the country's inhabitants and for the world.

In this sense, ignoring the signs of a major global conflict is not an act of academic prudence but a repetition — with new actors and technologies — of strategic errors amply documented by history. Some look hopefully to China, and even to Russia, but these states are constrained in their real capacity to challenge the United States in material terms. It must also be noted that their political-ideological alternative is not free of alarming aspects deserving of criticism.

Thus, the deterioration of the multilateral system and the absence of any real capacity to rein in the great powers — and especially their elites — have returned the world to a scenario in which interstate war is once again a card in common use. In the short term, the hegemon's threat of force may cement its control over the weaker states of the hemisphere, but sooner or later the clashing interests of the great powers may force the generation that forgot what a World War is to pay dearly for its lack of historical memory.

Methodological note:

The artificial intelligence tools ChatGPT and Claude were used for source consultation and verification, validation of data and figures, and the insertion of reference notes in the appropriate format.

References

1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), “Sharp Increase in Conflicts and Wars,” press release, June 11, 2025; SIPRI. “Unprecedented Rise in Global Military Expenditure as European and Middle East Spending Surges.” Press release. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2025. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges; Gortaire Morejón, Bernardo. Dragón Ascendente, Águila Desafiante: Desentrañando la competencia hegemónica entre China y Estados Unidos. 1.ª ed. electrónica. Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas-ESPE, diciembre de 2023. ISBN 978-9942-765-97-0. ↑

2. The White House, National Security Strategy 2025 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2025), especially the section titled “The Trump Corollary.” ↑

3. Associated Press. “Trump Revives Interest in Buying Greenland as US Eyes Strategic Arctic and Atlantic Positions.” AP News, December, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/trump-greenland-norway-panama-canal-canada-a52858e3075f9b5ad95e78753293fc1f; Associated Press. “China, US Tussle for Influence over the Panama Canal amid Belt and Road Tensions.” AP News, February, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/china-us-panama-canal-belt-road-9452852d8e074902d3f2a75fa73f5060 ↑

4. Mahan, Alfred T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. 12th ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1918. ↑

5. Maher, Kit, Kaitlan Collins, and David Goldman. “Venezuela Turns Over Millions of Barrels of Oil to the US under Trump Administration Deal.” CNN, January 6, 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/06/business/venezuela-turning-over-oil-trump; Singh, Kanishka, and Akanksha Khushi. “US Oversight of Venezuela May Last Years, Trump Tells NYT.” Reuters, January 8, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-says-us-oversight-venezuela-could-last-years-nyt-reports-2026-01-08/ ↑

6. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Occupied Palestinian Territory. “Reported Impact Snapshot | Gaza Strip (19 August 2026).” August 24, 2026. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-19-august-2026 ↑

7. Reuters. “Trump Threatens Iran over Protest Crackdown as Deadly Unrest Flares.” Reuters, January 2, 2026 (updated January 2, 2026). https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-threatens-iran-over-protest-deaths-unrest-flares-2026-01-02/ ↑

8. Reuters. “US Revokes Foreign Terrorist Designation for Syria’s HTS.” By Humeyra Pamuk. Reuters, July 7, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-ends-foreign-terrorist-designation-syrias-hts-2025-07-07/ ↑

9. Department of Homeland Security. “Under President Trump and Secretary Noem, the Department of Homeland Security Has Historic Year.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, December 19, 2025. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/12/19/under-president-trump-and-secretary-noem-department-homeland-security-has-historic ↑

10. Reuters, Florido, Adrian. “Supreme Court Allows Quick Third-Country Deportations, for Now.” NPR, June 23, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/06/23/nx-s1-5442676/supreme-court-allows-quick-third-country-deportations-for-now; Supreme Court of the United States. Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, No. 25A169, September 8, 2025. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/25a169_5h25.pdf ↑

11. Reuters, Reuters. “Venezuelans Held in Salvadoran Prison Look to Challenge Deportation in US Court.” Reuters, December 26, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/venezuelans-held-salvadoran-prison-look-challenge-deportation-us-court-2025-12-26/; Venkatraman, Sakshi. “US Immigration Agent Fatally Shoots Woman in Minneapolis.” BBC News, January 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0jvnl4j1n4o ↑

12. Executive Office of the President. Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2027. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2026. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2027-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2027-BUD.pdf ↑

13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “The Hague Summit Declaration.” Official Texts and Resources, June 25, 2025. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration ↑

14. Lotz, Avery. “Miller Says No One Would Stop U.S. from Seizing Greenland.” Axios, January 6, 2026. https://www.axios.com/2026/01/06/stephen-miller-greenland-europe-nato; The White House. “Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime.” Presidential Memorandum, August 12, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/expanding-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime/ ↑

15. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987): 82–107; Aiyar, Shekhar, Jiaqian Chen, Christian H. Ebeke, Roberto Garcia-Saltos, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, Anna Ilyina, Alvar Kangur, Tansaya Kunaratskul, Sergio L. Rodriguez, Michele Ruta, Tatjana Schulze, Gabriel Söderberg, and Juan P. Treviño. “Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.” Staff Discussion Notes 2023, no. 001 (2023). Accessed January 9, 2026. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400229046.006; McGerty, Fenella, and Karl Dewey. “Global Defence Spending Soars to New High.” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), February 2025. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/global-defence-spending-soars-to-new-high/; Freedom House. “United States: Freedom in the World 2025.” Freedom in the World. 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2025; V-Dem Institute. Democracy Report 2025: Democracy Under Siege. Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, 2025. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/60/V-dem-dr__2025_lowres.pdf; The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations That Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States.” White House Fact Sheets, January 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/ ↑

16. The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations That Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States.” White House Fact Sheets, January 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states; Faguy, Ana. “La condena al cierre de la agencia de ayuda USAID ordenado por Trump y que unió a Obama y a Bush.” BBC News Mundo, July 2025. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cy9x88j7373o ↑